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Desirable Restraint: Freeing Employers
and Employees from the Blanket
Prohibition of California Business
and Professions Code Section 16600
Jeremy Talcott*
INTRODUCTION
In California, the conventional wisdom has been essentially
settled for over fifteen years. As first hypothesized by AnnaLee
Saxenian, the success of Silicon Valley—and relative decline of
Route 128—is due to the “culture of mobility” present in Silicon
Valley, leading to a “high velocity labor market” and “knowledge
spillovers,”
as
compared
to
the
more
traditional,
vertically-integrated structure and long-term employment found
in Route 128 businesses.1 Ronald Gilson later attributed that
“culture of mobility” to California Business and Professions Code
section 16600, which has been read as a near-total ban on
covenants not to compete.2 However, new research suggests that
the time is right to revisit this assumption, and to consider a
legislative relaxation of section 16600.
Whether by deliberate intent of the drafter, mere oversight,
or by its later strict judicial interpretation, section 16600
establishes California as the state with the least legal
enforcement of covenants not to compete.3 Although most other
jurisdictions have long provided some enforcement of covenants
not to compete, using variations on the English “rule of reason”
as a limiting factor, California has adopted a broad public policy
against any restraints on the ability of citizens to engage in
trade, and the ban on enforcement is almost total.4
* J.D., Chapman University Fowler School of Law, May 2016. I wish to thank
Professor Tom W. Bell for his guidance with this Comment.
1 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
608–09 (1999); see also ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
2 Gilson, supra note 1.
3 See generally Sheri Wardwell, Invalidity of Covenants Not to Compete in
California Affects Employers Nationwide, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 22 (2009).
4 The exceptions are the sale of goodwill of a business and any covenant involving
the sale or dissolution of a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company. CAL.
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The arguments for and against enforcement of covenants not
to compete have presented problems for courts for more than 500
years.5 Employers—and, in some cases, employees—have many
reasons to desire post-employment restrictions such as covenants
not to compete. Covenants not to compete are generally seen as
the most effective means of preventing the loss of trade
information to a direct competitor.6 Further, these protections
are thought to promote more efficient operation internally within
businesses.7 Finally, post-employment restrictions may stimulate
internal research and improvement, rather than “employee
poaching” with the goal of accumulating competitors’ intellectual
property.8
Covenants not to compete are often criticized, however, as
“contracts of adhesion rising out of the perceived inequality in
bargaining power between employers and employees.”9
Covenants not to compete also limit the economic mobility of
employees, and restrict their ability to work within their chosen
field.10 Allowing employees to leave and form their own similar
businesses can lead to increased competition within a field.11
Encouraging the flow of information and ideas among businesses
may also improve efficiency across multiple competitors in an
industry by limiting duplicative research and development
among similar competitors.12 Covenants not to compete can also
restrict employers from hiring the most qualified employees,
potentially limiting—or even preventing—human capital from
reaching its most effective or efficient use.13
In arguing for the benefits of section 16600 with regards to
Silicon Valley, Ronald Gilson contends that section 16600 has
corrected the failure of the market to reach the most
economically rational solution in economic development
communities.14 If the benefit of the “knowledge spillovers” gained
from employees hired away from competitors creates a net
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 2015). Agreements preventing the use of trade secrets
are also enforceable, so long as they do “not restrain [a party] from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade or business within the meaning of section 16600 of the Business and
Professions Code.” Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 459 (Cal. 1958).
5 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
626 (1960).
6 Id. at 627.
7 Id.
8 See Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses
and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37 (2015).
9 Id. at 6.
10 Blake, supra note 5, at 627.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See Gilson, supra note 1.
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positive benefit for the company when compared to the value of
the intellectual property similarly lost to competitors, then
section 16600 has forced the most economically rational position
onto the community, even if that position is contrary to the desire
of each individual company to protect its intellectual property
and any associated market advantage over competitors.15
There are, of course, other associated costs to be weighed,
consistent with Bastiat’s idea of the “seen and the unseen.”16
Even if the costs and benefits are roughly balanced, it is
important to note that section 16600 has one further cost—a
significant reduction in both employer and employee freedom to
contract. California will not enforce a voluntarily entered
restriction on one’s employment, creating a restriction on the
ability of employees to knowingly bargain for a covenant not to
compete with their employers—and receive consideration
accordingly—whether in terms of increased compensation or
firm-sponsored training.
Courts have long looked critically at covenants not to
compete, finding that often there was unequal bargaining power,
and as such, the covenant was not truly bargained for.17 Most
jurisdictions have adopted some variation of the English “rule of
reason,” requiring the restraint to be “both reasonable in scope
and necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the employer.”18
Unfortunately, the inconsistent interpretation of what is a
“reasonable” restraint on trade has left the law of covenants not
to compete in a “state of near chaos.”19 Accordingly, some
commentators in other jurisdictions have suggested similar
prohibitions to California as the only means to protect employees
while maintaining consistency and predictability.20
This Comment proposes that California should consider
creating an additional exception to section 16600 for covenants
voluntarily entered into, but allowing only legal—not equitable—
remedies. Rather than subjecting California to the “chaos” of the
“rule of reason,” California should enforce covenants not to
compete—so long as they were knowingly bargained for—by
Id. at 609.
See generally FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1995). See infra Part III.
17 Blake, supra note 5, at 647–48.
18 Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and Contract
Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 155, 156 (2003).
19 Id. at 155; see also Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105
N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (“[Noncompete law] is a sea—vast and
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange
support for anything, if he lives so long.”).
20 Arnow-Richman, supra note 18, at 169.
15
16
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applying a “formation analysis” to all such agreements to look for
assent and unconscionability.21 By also legislating that all such
contracts shall remain renegotiable and limiting remedies to only
legal damages, California can prevent the total restraint of trade
by allowing the employee—or interested potential employers—to
“buy out” the covenant from the previous employer.
The time has never been better to call into question the
myriad ways that California is overly restrictive of employers
under the guise of protecting the rights of employees (of which
the interpretation of section 16600 is but one) as California has
found growth lagging behind that of other states. Indeed, in
2013, California lost its position as the number one
state-exporter of technology, falling behind Texas.22 The
technology industry is critical to California’s economy as the
single largest category of state exports, accounting for 27.7% of
exports during 2012.23 In 2014, that percentage declined to
24.5%.24
Relaxing the ban on covenants not to compete in California
would benefit employers through increased protection of
intellectual property and internal efficiency, and would benefit
employees through increased firm investment in human
capital—such as firm-sponsored training. Employers would be
assured the benefit of their investment, either through matching
employee offers or from receiving legal damages for the value of
the information the employee will be taking. Both parties—and,
therefore, the State of California as a whole—would benefit from
increased liberty. However, California would retain the certainty
of a black-letter prohibition, with limited and enumerated
statutory exceptions.
I. THE HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS
CODE SECTION 16600
California’s Business and Professions Code section 16600 has
its origins in the work of David Dudley Field, drafter of the New
York “Field Code” of civil procedure. New York’s Constitution of
1846 called for a code commission “to reduce into a written and
systematic code the whole body of the law of this state, or so
21 A similar solution was suggested as a reform for Texas by Rachel Arnow-Richman.
Id. at 165.
22 Press Release, TechAmerica Foundation, California is Second Largest Tech
Exporting State (Feb. 11, 2014), http://s3.amazonaws.com/siteninja/site-ninja1-com/1407
957293/original/California_Is_Second_Largest_Tech_Exporting_State.pdf [http://perma.cc/
AWU4-5LW2].
23 Id.
24 Trade Statistics, CAL. CHAMBER COM., http://www.calchamber.com/international/
trade/pages/tradestatistics.aspx [http://perma.cc/ERV2-3JR7].
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much and such parts thereof as to the said commissioners shall
seem practicable and expedient.”25 After Field’s code was adopted
by New York in 1848, Field was appointed to the Code
Commission in 1857.26 Along with William Curtiss Noyes and
Alexander Bradford, Field drafted a political code, a penal code,
and a civil code.27 Although Field published the final draft of his
civil code in 1865, it was never enacted in New York.28
Field’s draft codes were attractive to the newly admitted
states in the West, especially California. The “chaotic legal
environment” of California—where the common law of England
had been adopted to replace pre-statehood Spanish and Mexican
law, while nonetheless preserving elements of the Mexican land
grant system, as well as federal exceptions from the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo—had limited the Legislature’s ability to
abolish and repeal all prior law in California.29 Consequently,
codification was urged by a series of California Governors
throughout the 1860s.30 In 1868, a first effort was made by
appointing a commission to “revise and compile” the laws of the
State of California.31 When its report was submitted in 1870, it
included a recommendation to abolish the grand jury system.32
Seemingly uncomfortable with the recommendation, the
California Legislature chose to allow the first commission to
dissolve, instead creating a new commission empowered to use or
discard any work previously accomplished.33 This second
commission was appointed in 1870, and fairly quickly chose to
adopt Field’s New York draft codes almost in full, with changes
made where necessary to adapt it to previous California
legislation.34 The Civil Code was enacted (along with the Penal
Code, Political Code, and Code of Civil Procedure) in 1872.35 In
1873, a commission was selected to review the codes, and
amendments were proposed where the codes were found to
conflict with previously settled California law.36 Interestingly,
25 See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 190 (1981) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1846)).
26 Id. at 191.
27 See Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David
Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 243–45 (1942).
28 See Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny,
Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 100–01 (1989).
29 Gilson, supra note 1, at 615–16.
30 Id. at 615.
31 Rosamond Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes of California,
22 L. LIBR. J. 8, 14 (1929).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 15.
34 Id. at 18.
35 Id. at 19.
36 Id. at 15–17.
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the commission included Stephen J. Field, brother of David
Dudley Field and an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.37
Regardless of David Dudley Field’s true intent while writing
his New York draft codes, it seems clear that California’s intent
and understanding upon adopting them was that they did not
significantly alter the common law, but instead codified it and
made it accessible to the general public.38 According to the
Commission:
The primary object of its chief author and advocate, David Dudley
Field, was to restate in systematic and accessible form the common
law as it has been modified to suit American conditions, to settle
questions upon which disputes had arisen and to introduce such
reforms as might seem necessary to make the legal system
harmonious and free from anachronism.39

Even if David Dudley Field had intended to make significant
alterations to the common law, it is not clear that the California
Code Commission would have then had the authority to adopt
those significant changes. As was also noted by the Commission
itself: “It must be borne in mind that this Act does not provide for
the adoption of any new system of law, but simply reënacts the
existing law, with some few modifications, amendments, and
additions.”40
Section 1673 in the 1872 California Civil Code copied
verbatim the language of section 882 of Field’s draft New York
Civil Code. The section read as follows:
Section 1673. Every contract by which any one is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind,
otherwise than is provided by the next two sections, is to that extent
void.41

Those two exceptions, which had previously been sections
884 and 885 of Field’s draft New York Civil Code, provided the
following:
Section 1674. One who sells the good will of a business may agree
with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a
specified county, city, or a part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any
person deriving title to the good will from him, carries on a like
business therein.42
Id. at 17.
Id.
Maurice E. Harrison, The First Half-Century of the California Civil Code, 10 CAL.
L. REV. 185, 186 (1922).
40 W.W. Pendegast et al., First Report of the Joint Committee to Examine the Codes,
in CALIFORNIA CODE COMMISSION, REPORTS 1868–1874 (1907) (emphasis in original).
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (1872) (current version at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600).
42 Id. § 1674.
37
38
39
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Section 1675. Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution
of the partnership, agree that none of them will carry on a similar
business within the same city or town where the partnership business
has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof.43

At the time that Field wrote the draft code, the courts in
England and most states applied the rule of reason to contractual
restrictions on the conduct of a trade or business.44 In America,
however, from very early on there was heavier emphasis placed
on the protection of the employee.45 Nonetheless, American
courts generally did not apply a per se rule of invalidity on
post-employment restraints.46 The comment to section 833 of the
draft New York Civil Code noted that “contracts in restraint of
trade have been allowed, by modern decisions, to a very
dangerous extent.”47 However, the two cases referred to within
that comment both involved noncompetition covenants associated
with the sale of a business.48 It is impossible to know if Field
intended these sections to function as a complete ban on
post-employment covenants not to compete.49 These sections did
not appear in the preliminary draft of the New York Civil Code,
and were added sometime late in the process.50 The comments to
Field’s draft New York Civil Code, the California Code
Commissioner’s 1871 draft, and the 1872 official California Civil
Code make no mention of post-employment covenants not to
compete.51 These codes would eventually be moved to the
California Business and Professions Code when it was adopted in
1937, where they were relabeled sections 16600 and 16601.
Whether it was intended or not, California courts
subsequently read section 16600 as broadly as it is written.52
Though the earliest cases only discussed anticompetitive
arrangements between businesses, by the 1930s, California
courts began using the statute to void employment agreements
and similar contracts that sought to restrict former employees
from using knowledge gained while employed or engaging in

43
44
45
46
47

(1865).

Id. § 1675.
Blake, supra note 5, at 643.
Id. at 643–44.
See generally Blake, supra note 5.
COMM’RS OF THE CODE, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 255, at § 833

48 See id. (citing Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.Y. 241 (1851) and Whittaker v. Howe, 49
Eng. Rep. 150 (M.R. 1841)).
49 Gilson, supra note 1, at 617–18.
50 Id. at 618.
51 Id. at 618–19.
52 See Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for
Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2006).
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competitive business.53 It has since become the stated strong
policy of California courts to disfavor any restraints on trade.54
Accordingly, covenants not to compete in employment
agreements are per se illegal unless a clear statutory exception
exists.55
The public policy aims regularly cited by California courts
are the protection of both California citizens’ right to pursue “the
profession, trade or business of his or her choosing,” as well as
the “employer’s ability to compete for skilled employees.”56
California’s reading comports with the words of the statute, and
it seems almost certain that any change to the interpretation of
section 16600 will have to be made legislatively.57
The vast majority of states, however, enforce covenants not
to compete so long as such restraints are reasonable.58 Even
Id. at 6.
See Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 296 P.2d 554, 556 (Cal. 1956) (holding
that any agreement contrary to public policy or the express meaning of a statute cannot
serve as the foundation for any action in California).
55 See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 297 (Cal. 2008).
56 Wardwell, supra note 3, at ¶ 4.
57 Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d at 293 (“[We] leave it to the Legislature, if it
chooses, either to relax the statutory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the
prohibition-against-restraint rule under section 16600.”).
58 Wardwell, supra note 3, at ¶ 1 n.2 (listing states that apply some version of the
common law “rule of reason” as follows: “Alaska (Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Green, 757 P.2d 62,
65 (Alaska 1988)); Arizona (Am. Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Carter, 462 P.2d 838, 840 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1969)); Arkansas (Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Ark. 1999));
Connecticut (Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 902 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1993)); Delaware (Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 467 (Del. Ch. 1977));
District of Columbia (Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d 615, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Florida (FLA. STAT. § 542.335); Georgia (Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 484
S.E.2d 323, 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). But see Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. V(c)). See
Hawaii (Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (Haw. 1976); see also The 7’s Enters.,
Inc. v. Del Rosario, 143 P.3d 23, 36 (Haw. 2006)); Idaho (Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133,
1135 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)); Illinois (Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res.
Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)); Indiana (Norlund v. Faust, 675
N.E.2d 1142, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); Iowa (Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
595 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Iowa 1999)); Kansas (Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan.
1996)); Kentucky (Hall v. Willard & Woolsey, P.S.C., 471 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Ky.1971));
Maine (Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995)); Maryland (Ecology Servs., Inc.
v. Clym Env’t Servs., LLC, 952 A.2d 999, 1007 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)); Massachusetts
(Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 2004)); Michigan (St. Clair
Medical, P.C. v. Borgiel, 715 N.W.2d 914, 918-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)); Minnesota
(Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)); Mississippi
(Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So.2d 971, 975 (Miss. 1992)); Missouri (Cont’l
Research Corp. v. Scholz, 595 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Nebraska
(Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Neb. 1991)); Nevada (Camco, Inc.
v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 833 (Nev. 1997)); New Hampshire (Smith, Batchelder & Rugg
v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979)); New Jersey (Solari Indus. v. Malady, 264
A.2d 53, 57 (N.J. 1970)); New Mexico (Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 417 P.2d 450, 453-54
(N.M. 1966)); New York (Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgmt. Int’l, 7 N.Y.3d 616, 620 (N.Y.
2006)); North Carolina (Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996)); Ohio (Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (Ohio
1975)); Pennsylvania (Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002)); Rhode Island
53
54
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states that adopted civil codes similarly based on Field’s draft
code—and containing identical language—have instead
interpreted their statutes to enact the common law ban on
“unreasonable” covenants.59 While California’s reading of the
language admittedly seems more correct, the case law appears to
support the idea that most jurisdictions find value in at least
some enforcement of covenants not to compete. It is worth
considering, then, whether the near-total ban on covenants not to
compete has served as a net benefit to California employees and
employers, or if some enforcement of these types of
post-employment restrictions might lead to a more economically
beneficial outcome.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH OF SILICON VALLEY AND SECTION 16600
In her book Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in
Silicon Valley and Route 128, AnnaLee Saxenian famously
attributed the success of Silicon Valley—and relative decline of
Route 128—to the “culture of mobility” present in Silicon Valley,
leading to a “high velocity labor market” and “knowledge
spillovers,”
as
compared
to
the
more
traditional,
vertically-integrated structure and long-term employment found
in Route 128 businesses.60 Silicon Valley had a “regional
network–based industrial system that promotes collective
learning and flexible adjustment [due to its] dense social
networks and open labor markets . . . .”61
In his 1999 article The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, Ronald Gilson undertook to explain
the differing business cultures of Silicon Valley and Route 128
near Boston.62 Gilson contended that section 16600 directly led to
the optimal collective economic strategy in Silicon Valley,
overcoming the desire of each individual firm to act in their own
(Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods, Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1989)); South Carolina (Cafe
Assocs., Ltd. v. Gerngross, 406 S.E.2d 162, 164 (S.C. 1991)); Tennessee (Vantage Tech.,
LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)); Texas (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§§15.50-.52 (2001)); Utah (Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1992));
Vermont (Roy’s Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne, 454 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Vt. 1982)); Virginia
(New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26 (Va. 1993)); Washington
(Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448, 451-52 (Wash Ct. App. 1984)); West
Virginia (Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 915 (W. Va. 1982));
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2009)); Wyoming (Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic,
Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 543 (Wyo. 1993))”); see also BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT
TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (5th ed. 2006).
59 See Wardwell, supra note 3, at ¶ 1 n.4 (noting that Montana and Oklahoma have
both interpreted nearly identical statutes as adopting the common law rule of reason).
60 Gilson, supra note 1, at 579.
61 SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 2.
62 Gilson, supra note 1, at 593–94.
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self-interest by benefitting from the knowledge spillover of other
firms while restricting any knowledge lost through mobility of
their own employees.63
Fundamental to Gilson’s argument is the idea that
high-velocity employment creates an ecosystem in which the
per-firm benefit of innovation and growth will exceed the
per-firm cost of intellectual property dilution caused by the
inability to retain employees.64 However, even Gilson admits that
a blanket prohibition may only be beneficial to particular
industries, and discourage innovation and investment in others.65
As noted above, California remains relatively unique in its
almost complete prohibition on post-employment covenants not
to compete.66 Other jurisdictions appear hesitant to adopt a
similar strategy with regards to post-employment covenants not
to compete in the hope of replicating the success of Silicon Valley.
It is possible that even very large costs incurred by Silicon Valley
companies through intellectual property dilution have so far been
outweighed by other regional advantages.67 Indeed, there were
many other factors that led to the growth of Silicon Valley, such
as government investment, partnerships with universities, and
the culture of the region.68 Additionally, the sheer size of the
agglomeration economy that formed in Silicon Valley may be
difficult to replicate elsewhere, allowing it to retain an advantage
in attracting investment.69 In Working in Silicon Valley, Alan
Hyde called it “hardly plausible” that section 16600 could have
been enough to explain the success of Silicon Valley over Route
128.70
III. UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF SECTION 16600 ON
BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEE TRAINING
The competing values involved in enforcing covenants not to
compete (as with all the common law “restraints of trade”) have
long been debated.71 For employers, covenants not to compete
represent what is perhaps the most effective method of protecting
valuable trade information and consumer relationships from
Id. at 596.
Id. at 609.
See id. at 627.
See supra Part I.
See Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for
Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 309 (2006).
68 See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 33 (2003).
69 Bishara, supra note 67.
70 HYDE, supra note 68.
71 Blake, supra note 5.
63
64
65
66
67
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being easily appropriated by competitors.72 This protection
provides incentives to improve internal operations and stimulate
research, and allows companies to “achieve the degree of freedom
of communication” that leads to the highest internal efficiency.73
On the other hand, covenants not to compete reduce employee
mobility and freedom to pursue a chosen trade.74 Much of the
evolution surrounding covenants not to compete has reflected the
evolution in industrial technology and business methods, as well
as the “ebb and flow of such social values as freedom of contract,
personal economic freedom, and business ethics.”75
In the absence of a post-employment covenant not to
compete, employees are likely to take their knowledge to
competing firms in the same industry.76 Conversely, employers
are more likely to hire away employees from other firms, seeking
the knowledge that they will inevitably bring, as opposed to
investing in research and development.77 Accordingly, firms in
California are forced to turn to other methods to protect their
intellectual property. Although trade secret laws exist, they are
often insufficient to prevent the dilution of intellectual
property.78 Gilson himself recognizes that the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA)—which has been adopted by forty-seven
states, including California—provides “less effective protection
than may at first appear.”79 Under the UTSA, litigants are
required to establish imprecise distinctions between “trade
secrets” and “tacit knowledge,” resulting in litigation that is
likely to be expensive and slow, and unlikely to be resolved by
summary judgment.80 Indeed, this difficulty in enforcing trade
secret protection may also explain why many California firms
have simply adopted a policy of foregoing legal challenges under
trade secret law when employees leave.81
The relative ineffectiveness of enforcing trade secret law in
California only compounds the issue of internal firm inefficiency
caused by the inability to enforce post-employment covenants not
to compete.82 For example, it has been said that “Apple [is] one of
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 626.
Bishara, supra note 67, at 310.
78 See Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative
Failures: Divulging of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 105, 110–11 (2003).
79 Gilson, supra note 1, at 597; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426–3426.11 (West 2015).
80 Gilson, supra note 1, at 599.
81 HYDE, supra note 68, at 30.
82 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 608.
72
73
74
75
76
77
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the most secretive companies in the world.”83 Employees are
prevented from discussing projects, even among other internal
departments.84 Without internal compartmentalization, the
intellectual property dilution caused by a single employee leaving
to a competitor might be great. Arguably, Apple, better than any
other company, has found a way to “embrace secrecy,” and turn it
to
its
own
advantage.85
However,
this
internal
compartmentalization may hamper the ability of California
companies such as Apple to work efficiently, remove incentives to
maximize the knowledge base of individual employees, and
discourage intra-firm collaboration.
It is clear that there is still a strong desire among Silicon
Valley companies to have a mechanism to retain top employees.
In May 2014, a “who’s who of Silicon Valley companies”
announced the settlement of a class action lawsuit alleging
“anti-poaching agreements” between Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit,
Adobe, Pixar, and others.86 The lawsuit involved agreements
affecting at least 60,000 workers over a four-year period.87 The
rise of such surprisingly “formal and far reaching” anti-poaching
agreements within Silicon Valley has occurred because other
jurisdictions have an “easier legal alternative” in enforceable
covenants not to compete.88
Evan Starr at
the University of
Illinois
at
Urbana-Champaign has released what is the most current and
wide-ranging empirical study on the effect of covenants not to
compete on firm-sponsored training.89 Starr’s work provides
evidence that there is a causal relationship between the
enforcement of covenants not to compete and the availability of
firm-sponsored training.90 Gary Becker’s classic theory of general
human capital argues that workers should bear the cost of the
Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 914 (2012).
See, e.g., Jim Edwards, What Apple Employees Say About the Company’s Internal
Corporate Culture, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2013, 9:45 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/what-apple-employees-say-about-the-companys-internal-corporate-culture-20
13-10?op=1 [http://perma.cc/PL2H-CV2E].
85 ADAM LASHINSKY, INSIDE APPLE: HOW AMERICA’S MOST ADMIRED—AND
SECRETIVE—COMPANY REALLY WORKS 31–47 (2012).
86 Jon Xavier, Silicon Valley Anti-poaching Settlement: Big Money & Missed
Opportunities, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (May 1, 2014, 6:52 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
sanjose/news/2014/05/01/silicon-valley-anti-poaching-settlement-ig-money.html?s [http://per
ma.cc/SAD8-8J3R].
87 Id.
88 Id. (quoting Orly Lobel, a law professor at the University of San Diego, and author
of a book on economic analysis of the law and human capital).
89 See Evan Starr, Consider This: Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforceability of
Covenants Not to Compete 1 (Jan. 25, 2015) (unpublished working paper), https://sites.
google.com/site/starrevan/research [http://perma.cc/437L-P8LW].
90 Id.
83
84
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acquisition of the job-related knowledge that makes them
employable.91 However, numerous papers have noted that firms
routinely pay for general training.92 More importantly, this
training does not seem to result in commensurate wage cuts to
cover the cost of that training, creating a net benefit for the
employee of wages plus additional, valuable knowledge.93 So long
as the training of employees causes larger increases in
productivity than in the wages of the trained employees, it is
economically rational for firms to provide training.94 However,
increasing employee mobility provides a disincentive, in that it
prevents firms from providing (and employees from receiving) the
most economically efficient level of firm-sponsored training.95
This idea is not new. Others have noted that covenants not
to compete are generally unlikely to be desirable tools in
perfectly competitive labor markets.96 However, when workers
cannot acquire the necessary training independently—such as in
jobs that require sharing firm-specific, confidential information—
the enforceability of covenants not to compete shifts the incentive
to the firms to provide training.97 In circumstances such as these,
a firm must have some mechanism to ensure that the employee
will not simply appropriate the value of the training by leaving to
a competitor before the company has recouped the value of that
training
through
increased
employee
productivity.98
Enforceability of covenants not to compete provides the
mechanism that allows employers to recover that value.99
Starr’s work suggests that if California (the lowest enforcing
state) were to adopt the policy of Florida (the highest enforcing
state), then the most impacted occupations in California could
receive a 16% increase in the likelihood of receiving
firm-sponsored training. It is especially notable that the effect is
most noticeable among high-technology firms, such as those in
Silicon Valley. This increased training is especially prevalent in
the initial years of an employee’s tenure in those jurisdictions
Id. at 8.
Id.
See John M. Barron et al., Do Workers Pay for On-the-Job Training?, 34 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 235, 235–52 (1999).
94 See generally Daron Acemoglu, Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills?
Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1055 (1998).
95 See John H. Bishop, Underinvestment in On-the-Job Training? 1 (Cornell U. Sch.
Ind. Lab. Rel., CAHRS Working Paper No. 91-03, 1991), http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=cahrswp [http://perma.cc/5EPF-MU86].
96 See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 95 (1981).
97 Id. at 96.
98 Id. at 97.
99 Id. at 97–98.
91
92
93
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where an employer will be able to recover the value in
productivity of any training provided.100 While there is often
academic concern about “wage compression” when employees are
restrained from accepting competing offers of employment by a
covenant not to compete, the increased productivity of employees
often also leads to higher wages, acting as a counter-balance.101
There is also evidence that in some professions employees earn
more due to a position of increased trust with their employer.102
This seems to comport with the predictions made by Eric
Posner et al., in Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of
Covenants Not to Compete, where they posited that enforcement
of covenants not to compete as written should still lead to the
most efficient outcomes in human capital investment.103
Importantly, so long as covenants not to compete remain open to
negotiation, employees and potential employers retain a
mechanism to ensure that employees’ skills will be put to the
most efficient use.104 This is done by placing a value on the
training provided, while also allowing a value to be placed on the
knowledge that is gained or lost by the defection of an employee
to a competitor.105 They determined that enforcement of
covenants not to compete could still lead to both ex post and ex
ante efficiency by preventing overinvestment in human capital
where specific performance is an enforceable remedy and
underinvestment in human capital when there are zero
liquidated damages.106 Posner et al. determined that courts
should expand recognized interests to include firm-sponsored
training when evaluating covenants not to compete, yet remain
wary of overreaching by employers attempting to extract rents
from prospective employees through crafting overly broad
covenants not to compete.107 In addition, so long as covenants not
to compete remain renegotiable, the effect on labor mobility is
slight.108
See Starr, supra note 89, at 39.
Id.
See Kurt Lavetti et al., Buying Loyalty: Theory and Evidence from Physicians 4
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439068 (finding that physicians with covenants
not to compete had contracts with output incentives that are more than twice as strong,
were over 40% more productive, earn 14% higher wages, and have within-job earnings
growth that is 21 percentage points higher, despite being of the same average quality as
physicians without covenants not to compete, with these effects increasing in magnitude
with the enforceability in each state).
103 Posner et al., Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants Not to
Compete 3 (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 137, 2004), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=285805.
104 Id. at 25.
105 Id. at 3.
106 Id. at 2.
107 Id. at 25.
108 Id. (noting, additionally, that in California, deferred compensation is commonplace
100
101
102
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CALIFORNIA
In light of these differing market pressures, the question
becomes one of degree. At what point does the value of the
employee knowledge lost because of training they will never
receive outweigh the value gained by employers who benefit from
competitor technology obtained through “knowledge spillovers”?
While this Comment has sought only to look at the effects within
California as compared to other jurisdictions, it may also be
possible that California has benefitted to some extent by the very
uniqueness of the ban on post-employment covenants not to
compete. So long as they are enforced in other jurisdictions,
California becomes an attractive location for former employees to
“flee” and create a direct competitor to their previous employer—
especially where that previous employer would have been able to
enforce a reasonable covenant not to compete in the original
jurisdiction. However, once established, these companies then
face the same threat from their own employees. In this way,
section 16600 might bias California to small, high-velocity
startup companies, at the cost of long-term employer and
employee stability.109 The merits of this distinction are beyond
the scope of this Comment, and left to later research.
While valid policy reasons might exist for California to
prevent its citizens from bargaining away their future ability to
work in the field of their choosing, a subtle relaxation of section
16600 would return an incentive to train internal employees,
while leaving in place the ability to “poach” outside talent when
it would lead to the more efficient outcome.110 By limiting the
remedies to legal remedies, instead of equitable, California
businesses would be able to accurately weigh the cost-benefits of
hiring outside talent versus training internal talent, by providing
a means of effectively “buying out” the covenant not to compete
from new employees. Additionally, subjecting any covenant not to
compete to a “formation analysis” allows California courts to still
police covenants not to compete for overreaching by employers,
and protect California employees by retaining the ability to void
contracts for either lack of assent or unconscionability.
Perhaps the largest potential downfall to any relaxation of
section 16600 would be the loss of “knowledge spillovers” that
Saxenian and Gilson have credited for the success of Silicon
Valley.111 But to the extent that “knowledge spillovers” between
and often said to serve the same effect as liquidated damages for an enforceable covenant
not to compete).
109 HYDE, supra note 68, at 31.
110 See supra Introduction.
111 See supra Part II.
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companies are lost, new avenues for “knowledge spillovers”
within companies may grow, increasing internal efficiency while
reducing costly trade secret and patent litigation. Indeed, even if
California were to legislatively provide for the enforcement of
post-employment covenants not to compete in the future, many of
the same arguments for inter-firm sharing of knowledge and the
benefits of employee mobility would remain equally valid. 112
Especially in the tech industry, research suggests that many
such knowledge “spills” are anything but unintentional, with
clear patterns of knowledge being voluntarily exchanged across
industries, and even across countries.113 Even in jurisdictions
where covenants not to compete are fully enforceable, firms are
likely to engage in cost-benefit analyses of sharing knowledge—
even with direct competitors—where such actions are
economically beneficial to the companies involved.114
CONCLUSION
While the information presented here may not conclusively
“tip the scale” enough to prove that California’s prohibition on
covenants not to compete has caused harm exceeding any value
created through “knowledge spillovers,” it should stimulate
discussion as to whether the near-complete prohibition is in fact
a net positive gain for California. Indeed, if the costs and benefits
of the ban on covenants not to compete are roughly equal, then it
seems that the preferable state would be to allow people the
liberty to enter into covenants not to compete voluntarily, rather
than ban them outright.
To protect the arguably valid public policy concerns of
unequal bargaining power that California courts have long
considered when rejecting both the “rule of reason” or any
“narrow restraint exception” while interpreting section 16600,
the Legislature can provide a limited exception that allows
post-employment covenants not to compete when subjected to a
“formative analysis,” looking for assent and unconscionability, as
well as by providing that all such contracts will be renegotiable
and limited to legal—rather than equitable—remedies.
At a time when California finds itself struggling to stay
competitive with other states and facing a decline in technology
exports, California should consider a legislative exception for
112 See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO
TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).

BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN

113 Melissa M. Appleyard, How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the
Semiconductor Industry, in THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 537, 548 (Chun Wei Choo & Nick Bontis eds., 2002).
114 Id.
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voluntarily entered covenants not to compete as one small
measure to increase the attractiveness of Silicon Valley for the
investment of venture capital, the establishment of new
businesses, and to lessen incentives for established companies to
leave for states that are seen as more “employer favorable.” Both
employers and employees should encourage a measure that
would create incentives for firm-sponsored investment in human
capital, as well as lead to increased internal efficiency. Finally,
everyone should welcome the increased liberty that results when
both employer and employee are able to bargain for and
voluntarily enter into mutually agreeable terms of their
employment relationships—including enforceable post-employment
covenants not to compete.
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